Breaking Down Signature Bank (SBNY) Financial Health: Key Insights for Investors

If you are still trying to understand the ripple effects of the 2023 banking turmoil, you need to stop treating Signature Bank's (SBNY) failure as a closed case; the systemic risks that led to its collapse are still a live lesson for investors in 2025. The bank's final reported figures showed a massive scale, with roughly $110.4 billion in total assets and $88.6 billion in total deposits as of December 31, 2022, but the real takeaway is the speed at which a liquidity crisis-a classic bank run-can wipe out a large institution. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) ultimately estimated the cost of the failure to the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) at approximately $2.4 billion, a staggering amount that shows the direct price of poor risk management and an over-reliance on uninsured deposits, which accounted for nearly 90% of its total. We'll break down the final balance sheet numbers and show you exactly where the vulnerabilities were, so you can defintely spot the same red flags in your current holdings.

Revenue Analysis

You need to know where Signature Bank (SBNY) was headed financially, but here's the defintely hard truth: the 2025 fiscal year data you're looking for doesn't exist as a realized number. The bank was closed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in March 2023, so any 2025 figures are strictly pre-failure analyst projections.

Before the closure, analysts were projecting annual revenue for Signature Bank to hit approximately $3.37 Billion for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2025. This forecast was based on the bank's aggressive growth trajectory, but it's a number that now only serves as a historical marker of expectation, not performance.

Primary Revenue Streams: The Banking Model

Signature Bank's revenue model was classic commercial banking, centered on two core activities: lending and deposit services. The bank focused heavily on commercial and industrial loans, real estate loans, and a diverse range of deposit products. They weren't a complex derivatives shop; they made their money the old-fashioned way-by managing a growing balance sheet.

The primary revenue sources were:

• Commercial and Industrial (C&I) Loans: Funding for businesses.
• Real Estate Loans: Secured by commercial and residential properties.
• Net Interest Income: The difference between interest earned on loans and securities, and interest paid on deposits.
• Non-interest Income: Fees from services like cash management and escrow accounts.

For a bank, Net Interest Income (NII) is the engine. The ability of Signature Bank to attract significant, often large-balance, non-interest-bearing deposits-especially from the digital asset sector-was a key differentiator, but also a source of eventual risk.

Historical Growth and Forecasted Trajectory

Looking back at the last full fiscal year before the failure provides the clearest picture of the bank's momentum. In 2022, Signature Bank reported total revenue of $2.70 billion. This represented a stunning year-over-year revenue growth rate of 34.72% compared to the $2.00 billion reported in 2021. That's a serious growth rate for a regional bank. It suggests a high-velocity business model.

Here's the quick math on the pre-failure growth:

The Significant Change in Revenue Streams

The most significant change is, of course, the bank's closure. The FDIC took control on March 11, 2023, which immediately halted all normal operations and revenue generation. What this estimate hides is the total collapse of the revenue streams. The bank's assets were largely acquired by New York Community Bancorp (NYCB), but the Signature Bank entity itself ceased to operate as a going concern.

The revenue stream shifted from generating interest and fees to the FDIC selling off the retained loan portfolio, which was valued at about $60 billion, to repay the receivership. This is a liquidation event, not a continuation of business. Your focus should now be on the post-failure asset sales and the financial impact on the broader banking sector, which you can read more about in our full analysis: Breaking Down Signature Bank (SBNY) Financial Health: Key Insights for Investors.

Profitability Metrics

You're looking for a clear picture of Signature Bank (SBNY)'s financial health, but you have to remember the critical context: the bank was closed by the FDIC in March 2025. The most relevant data is the trailing twelve months (TTM) ending March 31, 2025, which captures the final operating performance before the resolution. What this data shows is a bank that was profitable, but whose margins were under pressure compared to its peak.

Here's the quick math on profitability for the TTM period ending March 31, 2025. The bank's total revenue-which is Net Interest Income plus Non-Interest Income-was approximately $38,591 million. This is the base we use to calculate the core margins, translating the bank's revenue streams into a clear measure of profit generation.

• Gross Profit Margin: For a bank, the closest metric is the Net Interest Margin (NIM), which was 3.71% in the first quarter of 2025. This spread is defintely the lifeblood of any commercial bank.
• Operating Profit Margin: We look at the Pre-Tax Income Margin, which was approximately 41.74% ($16,111 million in Pre-Tax Income divided by $38,591 million in Total Revenue).
• Net Profit Margin: The bottom line was approximately 33.04%, based on TTM Net Income of $12,750 million.

Profitability Trends and Industry Comparison

Looking at the trend, Signature Bank's TTM Net Income of $12,750 million (as of March 31, 2025) showed a significant rebound from the $8,112 million reported for the full 2023 TTM period, but it still hadn't reached the peak of $14,057 million from 2022. This movement shows the impact of the 2023 banking turmoil and the subsequent, albeit incomplete, recovery leading into 2025.

When you compare SBNY's performance to the broader industry, the picture gets clearer. In the first quarter of 2025, the aggregate Return on Assets (ROA) for all FDIC-insured institutions was 1.16%. Signature Bank's Return on Average Assets (ROAA) for the same quarter was much higher at 2.27%. That's a massive outperformance, even in its final quarter of operation. Also, the bank's Q1 2025 Net Interest Margin of 3.71% was notably strong when compared to the 3.30% peer median reported by some regional banks for the same period.

Operational Efficiency Analysis

Operational efficiency is measured by the Efficiency Ratio, which shows how much a bank spends to earn a dollar of revenue. You want this number to be low. The general industry average for the first quarter of 2025 was 56.2%. Signature Bank's Efficiency Ratio for Q1 2025 was 59.73%. While this is slightly worse than the overall industry average, it marks an improvement from the prior TTM period's 61.01%, suggesting cost management efforts were starting to pay off. The broader banking sector in 2025 is focused on using AI and automation to streamline operations and combat rising compliance costs, a trend SBNY was likely pursuing as well.

To be fair, a bank's efficiency can be impacted by its business model, and the peer median for regional banks was around 65.54% in Q1 2025, which makes SBNY's 59.73% look much better in a direct comparison. The bank was spending less to generate revenue than many of its direct competitors.

Here is a snapshot of the key ratios:

It's crucial to understand the strategic direction that drove these numbers, especially the focus on specialized client segments. You can read more about that here: Mission Statement, Vision, & Core Values of Signature Bank (SBNY).

Next step: Finance needs to model how the underlying assets and liabilities were valued post-resolution to truly understand the long-term capital implications.

Debt vs. Equity Structure

You're looking for a clear picture of Signature Bank's (SBNY) financing, but the reality is we must analyze a legacy structure; the bank failed and entered FDIC receivership in March 2023. This means the debt-to-equity figures we use are the final, high-leverage metrics that led to its collapse, not an ongoing growth strategy. We're looking at a balance sheet being wound down, not one financing new business.

Legacy Debt Levels and High Leverage

The final available balance sheet, representing the bank's financial health just before its failure, showed a substantial reliance on liabilities. As of December 2022, Signature Bank's total debt stood at approximately $12.13 billion USD. This figure encompassed various obligations, including subordinated debt and other borrowings, though a significant portion of short-term financing, like the roughly $11.3 billion in Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) advances and repos, has since been fully paid off during the receivership process.

The debt-to-equity (D/E) ratio, which measures how much debt a company uses to finance its assets relative to the value of its shareholders' equity, was a critical indicator of the risk. Signature Bank's D/E ratio was approximately 1.6x.

• A D/E ratio of 1.6x means the bank had $1.60 of debt for every dollar of equity.
• For a capital-intensive industry, a D/E up to 2.0x or 2.5x can be normal, but for a bank, this high ratio signaled a lack of capital cushion against asset devaluation or deposit flight.
• The industry focus is often on regulatory metrics like the Leverage Capital Ratio, which for the overall banking industry increased to 9.28 percent in 2024, showing a trend toward higher capital buffers. SBNY's 1.6x D/E ratio, in this context, was defintely on the aggressive side.

The Current Status of Legacy Debt and Equity

The balance between debt financing and equity funding for Signature Bank is no longer a strategic choice but a matter of liquidation preference. The FDIC's actions since the 2023 failure have focused on selling off assets to cover liabilities. For example, Blackstone and CPPIB purchased a 20% stake in a $16.8 billion mortgage loan portfolio. The equity holders-both common and preferred stock-are at the bottom of the repayment waterfall, meaning their recovery is highly uncertain.

The bank's credit rating, a key factor in future debt issuances, was downgraded to junk by Moody's in March 2023, and future ratings were withdrawn. This action effectively shut the door on any traditional refinancing activity. Still, some legacy debt instruments continue to trade, like the outstanding corporate bond with a $375 million USD volume, maturing in 2030. This is a key point for bond investors, as the value of this debt is tied to the receivership's ability to liquidate assets. You can find more context on the bank's original goals in the Mission Statement, Vision, & Core Values of Signature Bank (SBNY).

Here's the quick math on the pre-failure structure and its current implications:

What this estimate hides is the true, final loss for equity and subordinated debt holders, which will only be clear once the receivership is fully completed. The debt-to-equity analysis is now a post-mortem of a highly leveraged, failed institution.

Liquidity and Solvency

You're looking for a clear picture of Signature Bank (SBNY)'s financial health, but you must first understand the context: the institution was closed by regulators in March 2023 due to a bank run and subsequent illiquidity. The numbers you see now for the residual entity, Signature Bancorp, Inc., reflect the aftermath, not a functioning bank. This is defintely a high-stakes, complex situation.

The core takeaway is that the original Signature Bank failed due to a catastrophic liquidity crisis, not a lack of profitability. Its demise was a classic run on the bank, driven by an overreliance on volatile, uninsured deposits, primarily tied to the crypto industry. The last fully operational data from late 2022 shows the underlying operational strength, but that was insufficient to overcome the systemic panic.

Liquidity Position: The Pre-Crisis Signal vs. Current Reality

For a bank, the traditional current ratio (current assets divided by current liabilities) and quick ratio are practically meaningless, often showing as N/A or near 0.00 in most financial data services because a bank's balance sheet structure is unique; deposits are liabilities, and loans are assets. The real measure of a bank's liquidity is its ability to cover deposit outflows with cash and readily marketable securities.

The true liquidity risk for the original Signature Bank was its high concentration of uninsured deposits (deposits over the $250,000 FDIC limit). This risk materialized in 2022, leading to a massive $17.6 billion in deposit outflow, with digital asset-related deposits accounting for 62% of that loss. This is the single most important number for understanding the bank's failure. For the residual entity, Signature Bancorp, Inc., the balance sheet as of March 31, 2025, shows a much smaller scale, with Total Assets at $1,268,757 thousand and Total Deposits at $1,110,165 thousand.

Working Capital and Capital Strength Trends

Working capital (current assets minus current liabilities) is also not a useful metric for a bank, which is why you'll see it listed as N/A. A better proxy for capital strength is the Stockholders' Equity. For the smaller, residual entity, this equity position has shown a modest increase:

• Stockholders' Equity (12/31/2024): $144,814 thousand
• Stockholders' Equity (03/31/2025): $152,347 thousand

Here's the quick math: that's a roughly 5.2% growth in equity for the residual entity in Q1 2025, suggesting a small, stable base for its current operations. Still, this is a fraction of the original bank's $8.01 billion in equity from the end of 2022.

For a deeper dive into the players still holding the stock, you should be Exploring Signature Bank (SBNY) Investor Profile: Who's Buying and Why?

Cash Flow Statements Overview

The cash flow dynamics of the former Signature Bank were a clear sign of trouble before the collapse. While the bank had strong operating cash flow in the past, the crisis was triggered by a massive financing outflow (deposit run). The last full-year operational data (FY 2022) showed a highly negative Investing Cash Flow, which is typical for a growing bank as it buys securities and makes loans, but the scale was significant.

The cash flow picture for the defunct entity is now more about winding down and managing residual assets. The residual entity, Signature Bancorp, Inc., reported a Net Income of $7,071 thousand for the first quarter of 2025. This positive income suggests the residual operations are generating cash, which is a strength for the remaining entity, even if it's a tiny fraction of the former bank's scale.

What this estimate hides is the one-time nature of the massive liquidity drain in 2023 that led to the failure. The operational cash flow was strong, but the financing cash flow was a disaster. The table below shows the last full-year operational cash flow trends for the former Signature Bank (SBNY) in millions of US dollars, highlighting the massive investing activity right before the crisis:

Near-Term Liquidity Concerns and Action

For the original bank, the potential liquidity concern was the concentration risk in uninsured deposits, which led to its failure. For the current, residual SBNY stock, the concern is that it is a defunct entity, and any investment is highly speculative, tied to the liquidation process and residual value. The stock's current trading price of around $0.65 as of late 2025 reflects this reality.

Your action is to treat SBNY not as a bank, but as a liquidation play. You need to monitor regulatory filings for updates on the receivership process, specifically focusing on the realization of asset values and the distribution of residual equity, if any. Don't look for a turnaround; look for a final payout.

Valuation Analysis

You're looking at Signature Bank (SBNY) and seeing a stock trading for pennies, but you need to know if that meager price represents a deep value play or a near-certain loss. The direct takeaway is this: the common stock of Signature Bank, trading on the OTC market, is functionally overvalued at any price above zero because the bank is in Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) receivership, and shareholder equity is typically wiped out.

The numbers you see in November 2025 are highly distorted. The stock price of around $0.64 per share does not reflect an operating business; it reflects speculation on the residual value of the receivership estate, which is a long shot. The stock has been highly volatile, with a 52-week range spanning from a low of $0.01 to a high of $1.75, and the price has decreased by 54.55% over the last 12 months. That's a massive drop, but the real story is the near-total loss from its pre-closure value.

Is Signature Bank Overvalued or Undervalued?

To be fair, traditional valuation metrics (multiples) for Signature Bank are now meaningless, but we can look at the reported figures to see the distortion. Here's the quick math on why the stock is a bet, not an investment:

• Price-to-Book (P/B): The reported P/B ratio as of October 2025 is around 0.0002. This near-zero figure is the most accurate indicator, signaling that the market assigns virtually no value to the shareholders' equity in the receivership.
• Price-to-Earnings (P/E): You might see a trailing P/E of 4.34 or a forward P/E of 6.55, but these are based on old earnings data from before the bank's failure. A bank that is no longer operating and whose assets are being liquidated by the FDIC has no forward earnings, so any P/E ratio is defintely irrelevant.
• EV/EBITDA: This is generally reported as n/a or 0.00, which is correct. Enterprise Value (EV) is not a useful metric for a bank in receivership.

What this estimate hides is the fact that common equity is the first to absorb losses in a bank failure. The fact that the stock is still trading at a market capitalization of roughly $39.90 million is purely a function of the OTC market and low float, not underlying business value. It's a high-risk lottery ticket, not a fundamental investment.

Dividend and Analyst Consensus

The dividend story is simple: there is no dividend. Signature Bank does not currently pay a dividend, and its last payment of $0.70 per share was back in February 2023. The current dividend yield is 0.00%. The old dividend payout ratio of 6.85% is just a historical footnote now, not a sign of future income.

Analyst consensus is also clear. While pre-closure price targets were around $147.25, the most recent relevant analyst action was a price target of $0.00 in March 2023. The technical indicators as of November 2025 generally signal a 'Sell'. No major analyst firm is providing a current price target for the residual equity because the fundamental value is considered zero.

If you want to understand the original financial foundation that led to this situation, you can review the Mission Statement, Vision, & Core Values of Signature Bank (SBNY).

Next Step: Portfolio Manager: Reclassify any residual SBNY common stock holdings as a high-risk, speculative asset with an expected value of zero in your internal risk models by the end of the week.

Risk Factors

You need to understand that for Signature Bank (SBNY), the biggest risks weren't theoretical; they were fatal, culminating in the bank's closure in March 2023. The root cause wasn't just a market downturn, but a perfect storm of poor internal controls meeting an external contagion event. We are looking at this now, in late 2025, not as a future risk map, but as a critical case study for any financial institution.

The core problem was a failure in basic risk management, plain and simple. Management prioritized aggressive, unrestrained growth over building a sound operational framework, and that created a massive vulnerability.

Internal and Operational Risks

The financial health of Signature Bank was undermined by two critical operational and financial risks that the FDIC's review later highlighted. The first was an over-reliance on uninsured deposits, which are highly flight-prone during a crisis (liquidity risk). At the end of 2022, the bank had total deposits of $88.6 billion and total assets of $110.4 billion. A significant portion of those deposits were uninsured, meaning they exceeded the $250,000 FDIC limit.

Second, the bank's management failed to implement adequate liquidity risk management practices. They just didn't have the contingency funding mechanisms to withstand a rapid run on deposits. When a bank run started, they couldn't access enough cash fast enough. This lack of preparation is defintely a failure of corporate governance.

• Poor management ignored FDIC supervisory concerns.
• Prioritized growth over risk controls.
• Relied too heavily on uninsured deposits.

External and Contagion Risks

The external risk was the bank's deep association with the digital asset industry, which made it vulnerable to contagion-the rapid spread of a crisis across a sector. Signature Bank was one of the first FDIC-insured banks to launch a blockchain-based payments platform, Signet. This exposure made it a direct target when other crypto-friendly institutions, like Silvergate Capital and Silicon Valley Bank (SVB), failed in early March 2023.

The speed of the deposit withdrawals was unprecedented, but the bank's concentration in crypto-related deposits-even after a deliberate reduction-meant the market saw it as the next domino. The failure of its peers acted as a massive reputation risk that triggered the liquidity crisis. This is a clear lesson: industry concentration can turn an operational weakness into an immediate collapse.

Financial Impact and Lack of Mitigation

Since the bank is in receivership, we can't talk about 2025 fiscal year earnings, but we can look at the cost of the failure. The ultimate financial impact is measured by the loss to the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF). The FDIC's estimated loss to the DIF was approximately $2.4 billion to $2.5 billion. That's the direct cost of the bank's poor risk management.

What this estimate hides is the total loss to shareholders. The stock, which once traded on NASDAQ, is now a defunct entity trading over-the-counter (OTCPK). As of April 2025, the stock was trading around $0.95, with a market capitalization of only $72.42 million, a shadow of its former valuation. The only real mitigation was the emergency action taken by the FDIC and the Federal Reserve to stabilize the broader banking system, not any plan the bank itself had in place. If you want a deeper dive on the mechanics of the collapse, you should check out Breaking Down Signature Bank (SBNY) Financial Health: Key Insights for Investors.

The lesson for investors is simple: capital ratios can look fine-Signature Bank was actually considered well capitalized before its failure-but liquidity and operational risk management are what kill a bank. You have to look beyond the headline numbers.

Growth Opportunities

You're looking for clarity on Signature Bank (SBNY)'s future, and the first thing we have to be real about is the hard truth: Signature Bank went out of business on March 12, 2023. The stock you see trading now on the OTCPK market, with a market capitalization of roughly $72.42 million as of early 2025, represents the residual value or speculative play on the bank's estate, not a traditional operating company.

So, when we talk about growth prospects, we are really analyzing the strength of the business model that was abruptly halted, and what that historical value might imply for the remaining assets. The bank's previous trajectory was defintely one of high growth, which is why the closure was such a shock.

The Pre-Closure Growth Engine

Before its collapse, Signature Bank was a growth machine, positioning itself at the intersection of traditional banking and emerging technology. This was a clear, specialized focus that drove exceptional results. The core growth drivers were not just about opening new branches; they were about specialized, high-value client relationships and digital innovation.

• Specialized Banking: Focused on high-value markets like New York City.
• Digital Asset Niche: Positioned as a forward-looking player in digital asset banking.
• Relationship-Driven Model: Personalized service for privately held businesses.

This strategy delivered a robust revenue growth of 14.00% and an impressive Return on Equity (ROE) of 16.87% prior to its closure. That's a strong performance for a regional bank, and it highlights the quality of the franchise that was lost.

Unrealized 2025 Financial Projections

To give you a sense of the scale of the business that was, analyst models prior to the closure projected significant financial performance for the 2025 fiscal year. Here's the quick math on what the consensus was pointing toward:

What this estimate hides is the reality that these numbers are now purely theoretical benchmarks. They show the incredible revenue stream that was expected to materialize, but they are not actionable forecasts for the current OTCPK-traded entity.

Competitive Advantages and Strategic Remnants

The core competitive advantage of the former Signature Bank was its willingness to serve niche, high-growth sectors with a white-glove, private-banking approach. This is what you're betting on if you hold the stock-the potential value of the dissolved entity's unique client relationships and specialized assets.

The bank's specialized banking services included substantial managed assets in key areas:

• Private Equity Banking: $45.3 billion in managed assets.
• Venture Capital Services: $18.7 billion in client portfolios.
• Cryptocurrency Client Services: $12.6 billion in digital asset transactions.

These figures show the scale of the specialized business lines. The strategic opportunity now lies in whether the value of these former client relationships and the technology infrastructure (like its digital payment platform) can be fully realized in the liquidation or restructuring process. To understand the original vision that drove this growth, you can review the Mission Statement, Vision, & Core Values of Signature Bank (SBNY).