Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste, S. A. B. de C. V. (ASR): 5 FORCES Analysis [Nov-2025 Updated]

You're assessing Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste, S. A. B. de C. V. (ASR), which operates a unique portfolio of 16 airports under government concessions, giving it a powerful but highly regulated footing across Mexico, Puerto Rico, and Colombia. Honestly, the real story here is the tension between that regulated strength and rising external pressures: supplier power is definitely climbing due to state monopolies and government-mandated costs that drove a 10% increase in Mexico during Q1 2025, while the threat of new entrants is immediate, with the new Tulum Airport already diverting 426,287 passengers between January and August 2025. Plus, even with customer tariffs capped by AFAC, the competitive rivalry in Mexico is squeezing margins, as seen in the 1.3% year-over-year decline in Q3 consolidated EBITDA. Let's break down exactly where the leverage sits across all five forces to map out ASR's near-term strategic reality.

Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste, S. A. B. de C. V. (ASR) - Porter's Five Forces: Bargaining power of suppliers

When you look at Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste, S. A. B. de C. V. (ASR)'s supplier landscape, you see a clear pattern of high leverage from government-controlled entities. This isn't a market where you can easily shop around for better terms; the key suppliers are either monopolies or state-dominated players, which inherently shifts power toward them.

Let's start with air traffic control. Servicios a la Navegación en el Espacio Aéreo Mexicano (SENEAM) is the state-owned monopoly supplier for navigation services in Mexican airspace. They control the radar surveillance and communication infrastructure essential for safe operations. While the last official fee adjustment was in April 2024, the underlying structure means ASR has no alternative for these critical services. For context on the scale SENEAM manages, air operations in Mexico were projected to hit 2,334,874 in 2025, an 11.34% increase over 2014 figures. You can't negotiate with a monopoly; you accept the terms of service.

Fuel supply is similarly concentrated. Aeropuertos y Servicios Auxiliares (ASA), a state-owned entity, consolidates its leadership in the supply, commercialization, and storage of aviation fuels across Mexico's national airports in 2025. This dominance means ASR's fuel costs are heavily influenced by ASA's pricing and operational efficiency. ASA is actively investing to maintain this control, planning an investment of over MXN 400 million for new specialized supply equipment in 2025, adding to the over MXN 655 million invested in 2024. With a total fleet of 447 supply equipment units, ASA ensures its grip on this vital input for your airline customers.

The government's influence extends beyond direct services, hitting ASR's operating costs directly. You saw this pressure in the first quarter of 2025. Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste, S. A. B. de C. V. (ASR) reported that total expenses in Mexico rose by 10% in Q1 2025. A significant part of that increase stemmed from government-mandated costs, including the impact of the 12% increase in the general minimum wage, effective January 1, 2025, which raised the daily rate to MXN 278.80 pesos. Also, decreases in concession fees, which are government-negotiated, contributed to the cost structure changes.

Now, construction and maintenance firms-the suppliers for your capital expenditure and upkeep-sit in a different spot. Their power is moderate. They need specialized infrastructure knowledge, which limits the pool of qualified contractors, but competition exists, unlike with SENEAM or ASA. Still, when you look at the overall cost picture, these firms' pricing power is often secondary to the regulatory and utility costs you face.

Here's a quick look at the key supplier-related financial and statistical pressures ASR faced as of late 2025:

The leverage held by these key suppliers translates into specific operational considerations for Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste, S. A. B. de C. V. (ASR):

• Reliance on SENEAM for all controlled airspace navigation.
• Exposure to state pricing mechanisms for aviation fuel via ASA.
• Direct cost impact from government-mandated labor increases.
• Need for specialized, non-commodity contractors for infrastructure.

If onboarding maintenance crews takes longer than expected, project timelines definitely slip.

Finance: draft 13-week cash view by Friday.

Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste, S. A. B. de C. V. (ASR) - Porter's Five Forces: Bargaining power of customers

You're looking at Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste, S. A. B. de C. V. (ASR) from the perspective of its airline customers, and the power they wield is a mixed bag, heavily tilted by regulation.

Major Airlines as Concentrated Buyers

The airlines that use Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste, S. A. B. de C. V.'s nine Mexican airports are definitely concentrated buyers of aeronautical services. While specific customer mix for ASR's Mexican segment isn't public in the latest reports, we can see the competitive landscape among the major players in the U.S.-Mexico transborder market, which heavily influences traffic at ASR's key hubs like Cancun International Airport.

Here's how the major U.S. carriers stack up in terms of U.S.-Mexico transborder seat share, which gives you a feel for the leverage held by the largest entities:

To be fair, this data is for the entire transborder market, not just ASR's specific airports, but it shows that a handful of carriers control the majority of the demand that feeds into ASR's system. Also, note that in early November 2025, the U.S. DOT suspended 13 flight routes operated by Aeroméxico, Volaris, and Viva Aerobus, citing unfair practices, which shows the regulatory environment can shift buyer leverage quickly.

Tariff Regulation Limits Pricing Power

Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste, S. A. B. de C. V.'s ability to raise aeronautical tariffs-the fees charged to airlines-is not set in a vacuum; it's strictly controlled by the Mexican government via the Federal Civil Aviation Agency (AFAC). The terms of the tariff base regulation are set forth in Annex 7 of the concession agreements.

The regulatory oversight means that any pricing power Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste, S. A. B. de C. V. has is capped by the Joint Maximum Tariff, which is ordinarily determined once every five-year period. AFAC retains the power to stipulate adjustments, even reducing tariffs if revenues exceed the established maximum in a calendar year.

• AFAC reviews and adjusts maximum fees based on concession agreement provisions.
• Tariff modifications directly influence the cost of flights for passengers.
• The regulatory framework provides a legal basis for fee adjustments.

Temporary Capacity Leverage from Airline Operational Issues

Sometimes, external factors temporarily shift leverage away from the buyers. For instance, in the first half of 2025, the ultra-low-cost carrier Volaris was recovering from grounding aircraft due to Pratt & Whitney engine inspections. This operational constraint temporarily reduced the airline's capacity leverage against the airport operator.

Here are some key figures related to that specific buyer's situation:

• Volaris transported almost 15 million passengers in the first half of 2025.
• Volaris's load factor was 84% in the first half of 2025.
• The airline's first-half traffic rose about 7% compared to the same six months in 2024.

When an airline like Volaris has grounded aircraft, it has less flexibility to shift traffic to another airport, giving Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste, S. A. B. de C. V. a slight upper hand on existing service levels until the fleet is fully operational.

Low Direct Power for Passengers

Passengers, the ultimate end-users, have low direct bargaining power over Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste, S. A. B. de C. V.'s aeronautical revenue structure. This is because the company operates a portfolio of concessions in specific regions, creating a regional monopoly for the airport infrastructure itself.

Consider the traffic trends in Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste, S. A. B. de C. V.'s key Mexican segment as of October 2025:

Even with a slight dip in overall Mexican traffic in October 2025, passengers generally have few alternatives for accessing the primary destinations served by Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste, S. A. B. de C. V.'s airports, such as Cancun. Their power is channeled indirectly through the airlines, which then negotiate with the airport operator.

Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste, S. A. B. de C. V. (ASR) - Porter's Five Forces: Competitive rivalry

You're looking at the core of the competitive battleground for Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste, S. A. B. de C. V. (ASR) right now, and honestly, the numbers from its home market tell a clear story of pressure.

The Mexican airport sector operates as a structured oligopoly, meaning you've got a few big players controlling the space; ASR's main rivals here are Grupo Aeroportuario del Centro Norte, S. A. B. de C. V. (OMA) and Grupo Aeroportuario del Pacífico, S. A. B. de C. V. (PAC). While ASR grapples with softness in its domestic Mexican passenger volumes, OMA has been posting solid, consistent growth across its network. For instance, OMA reported its October 2025 terminal passenger traffic increased 8.5% year-over-year, with international traffic up 10.1%. Compare that to ASR's own Mexico operations for Q3 2025, where total passenger traffic actually decreased 1.1% year-over-year, driven by domestic traffic down 1.8% and international traffic down 0.3%. That difference in performance definitely shows where the rivalry is heating up.

This competitive environment is definitely weighing on ASR's profitability metrics. For the third quarter of 2025, the company's consolidated EBITDA declined 1.3% year-over-year, landing at Ps. 4,639.4 million. Furthermore, the adjusted EBITDA margin, which strips out the construction revenue effect, contracted to 66.7% from 68.3% in the prior year's third quarter. To be fair, the EBITDA in Mexico specifically declined close to 4% in the quarter, which is a significant drag.

Here's a quick look at how the traffic performance contrasts between ASR's Mexico segment and OMA during the late 2025 period, which helps map the rivalry:

Because of this domestic softness, ASR is actively diversifying away from Mexico, using strategic acquisitions to secure revenue streams in more stable currencies and markets. This is a clear action to mitigate local competitive and economic risks. The competition for international carriers among the three major Mexican airport groups is fierce, but ASR is making moves outside of Mexico to counter this.

The diversification strategy involves significant capital deployment outside of its core Mexican concessions:

• Acquisition of URW's airport retail concessions for US$295 million; closing expected in Q4 2025.
• Agreement to acquire CPC, which holds stakes in airports across Brazil, Ecuador, Costa Rica, and Curaçao.
• The CPC deal implies an enterprise value of R$13,700 million (US$2,566 million).
• The CPC portfolio reported proportionate EBITDA of R$1,300 million over the last twelve months.
• This acquisition is set to add over 45 million passengers to ASR's base, which was 71 million in 2024.

Still, even as ASR expands internationally, the competition for high-value international traffic remains a key factor across all its operations. While Mexico saw international traffic contract slightly in Q3 2025, ASR's Colombian operations showed strong international growth of 11.2% in the same period. The US retail acquisition also signals a direct play for high-yield international passenger spending at major US hubs.

Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste, S. A. B. de C. V. (ASR) - Porter's Five Forces: Threat of substitutes

The threat of substitutes for Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste, S. A. B. de C. V. (ASR) is highly segmented, depending entirely on the specific route and travel distance involved. For short-to-medium haul regional travel within the Yucatan Peninsula, a new government-backed competitor has emerged, though its immediate impact on ASR's core business appears limited.

The Maya Train is a government-backed regional rail substitute in the Yucatan Peninsula, connecting key tourist and population centers across the southeast states of Tabasco, Chiapas, Campeche, Yucatán, and Quintana Roo. The final section of its 1,554-kilometer route was inaugurated on December 15, 2024. Initial ridership data suggests growing popularity for regional tourism trips.

Initial Maya Train ridership is low relative to air travel volumes, and its inland route is less convenient for tourists whose primary destination is coastal or requires direct airport access. For instance, as of summer 2025, the train broke a record with over 50,000 weekly passengers. The most in-demand corridor, Cancún to Palenque, boasted an average weekend occupancy rate of 92%. However, by July 15, 2025, the total number of passengers transported was 1,359,317. To put this in perspective against ASR's scale, in Q3 2025, ASR's consolidated total passenger traffic was up 0.4% year-over-year, while its Mexican operations saw a 1.1% decrease in total traffic.

Long-haul international air travel, which forms a significant part of Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste, S. A. B. de C. V. (ASR)'s business across its operations in Mexico, Puerto Rico, and Colombia, has no viable substitute as of late 2025. The high-value, long-distance routes that feed into ASR's hubs simply cannot be replicated by ground or sea transport in terms of speed or directness. This is evidenced by the strong international growth in ASR's non-Mexican operations during Q3 2025, with Colombia seeing a 11.2% increase and Puerto Rico seeing an 11.7% increase in international traffic.

Bus and ferry services are poor substitutes for the long distances ASR's airports cover, especially for the international segment. While buses compete with domestic air travel on shorter routes, the experience is often inferior. For example, the Maya Train has been noted to transform what was a grueling, 12+ hour overnight bus ride to Palenque into a comfortable train journey. Furthermore, the train itself faces infrastructure lag, with reports noting that in Tulum, passengers disembark at a station far from the town center, leading to taxi shortages and fare surges. ASR's financial results reflect the relative strength of air travel; Q3 2025 revenues reached Ps. 8,765.4 million, and the company maintained a strong cash position of Ps. 16,259.3 million at September 30, 2025.

The threat of substitution is therefore concentrated in specific, shorter domestic corridors where the Maya Train operates, but the core, high-yield international traffic remains largely insulated. You should watch the Maya Train's planned freight line, which is slated for a first phase completion by the end of 2026, as that could introduce a new competitive dynamic for cargo, which is a different force entirely. For now, the substitution risk is localized.

• The Maya Train station near Tulum is reportedly located far from the heart of town.
• The Cancún Airport station sold 180,079 tickets by January 21, 2025.
• ASR's consolidated EBITDA for Q3 2025 was Ps. 4,639.4 million.
• The Maya Train is not expected to break even on passenger service alone until 2030.

Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste, S. A. B. de C. V. (ASR) - Porter's Five Forces: Threat of new entrants

You're looking at the barriers to entry for Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste, S. A. B. de C. V. (ASR), and honestly, the picture is one of entrenched, government-sanctioned dominance, but with a couple of very specific, recent cracks appearing.

Barriers are extremely high due to the long-term, government-granted concession model. This isn't like opening a new coffee shop; ASR operates under agreements that grant exclusive rights to operate, maintain, and develop its airports for a stated time. For its core Mexican assets, these concessions run from 1998 to 2048, a 50-year term. This structure effectively locks out direct competition for decades, as the government retains ultimate ownership of the infrastructure.

However, the threat materializes differently than traditional entry. The new, state-owned Tulum Airport is a direct entrant, diverting an estimated 426,287 passengers (Jan-Aug 2025). This new capacity, even with its reported connectivity issues, represents a direct, government-backed competitor siphoning traffic away from ASR's key Southeast Mexico operations. To put this in context, Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste, S. A. B. de C. V. (ASR) reported a year-to-date total passenger traffic of 27,875,680 passengers as of August 2025, representing a 2.5% decrease compared to the same period in 2024.

The structure of the existing framework means new private concessions in ASR's core Mexican market are virtually impossible right now. The existing agreements are long-term and exclusive, meaning a new operator can't simply bid for a piece of Cancun International Airport tomorrow. The government manages changes through Master Development Plans (MDPs) negotiated every five years, which solidifies the position of the incumbent operator, as seen when ASR secured a favorable MDP recently.

Where the threat is more immediate and tangible is in ASR's diversification efforts. ASR's strategic entry into US commercial airport retail (JFK, LAX) introduces new, established competitors in a different arena. Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste, S. A. B. de C. V. (ASR) announced a deal to acquire Unibail-Rodamco-Westfield (URW)'s retail concessions at key terminals at John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), and Chicago O'Hare International Airport (ORD) for an enterprise value of \$295 million. While this is an acquisition of an existing business, not a greenfield entry, it places ASR directly against established, large-scale airport retail operators who already dominate the concession space at major US gateway airports like JFK and LAX.

Here's a quick look at the competitive landscape shift in the US retail segment:

The threat of new entrants, therefore, is bifurcated. In Mexico, it's a low-probability, high-impact threat from state-backed projects like Tulum, which is already showing traffic diversion effects. In the US, the threat is immediate competition from established players in the retail sector, even as ASR buys into that market.

The key takeaways on this force are:

• Mexican concession model creates near-absolute barriers.
• Concession terms for ASR run until 2048.
• New state entrant (Tulum) diverted an estimated 426,287 passengers (Jan-Aug 2025).
• ASR's US retail expansion cost \$295 million.
• US retail entry means competing with operators at major hubs.

Finance: draft 13-week cash view by Friday