Grupo Aeroportuario del Pacífico, S.A.B. de C.V. (PAC): 5 FORCES Analysis [Nov-2025 Updated]

You're trying to get a clear, unvarnished view of Grupo Aeroportuario del Pacífico, S.A.B. de C.V. (PAC)'s competitive moat as of late 2025, and that means looking past the quarterly reports to the structural realities. Honestly, the five forces framework reveals a business heavily shaped by regulation: the Mexican government's power as the sole concession grantor is immense, yet PAC still managed to process 52.68 million passengers through October 2025, demonstrating strong customer demand. While major airlines can push back on regulated fees, the threat of new entrants is virtually zero due to the massive capital and 50-year concession requirements, cementing the current oligopoly with ASUR and OMA. So, let's dive into the specifics to see exactly where the pressure is coming from and where PAC has built its defenses.

Grupo Aeroportuario del Pacífico, S.A.B. de C.V. (PAC) - Porter's Five Forces: Bargaining power of suppliers

When you look at Grupo Aeroportuario del Pacífico, S.A.B. de C.V. (PAC), the power held by its suppliers is heavily skewed by one dominant entity: the Mexican government.

Mexican Government Holds High Power as the Sole Concession Grantor

Honestly, the government's role here is the biggest lever in the supplier power equation. Grupo Aeroportuario del Pacífico operates its 12 Mexican airports under concessions granted by the Mexican government. The Federal Civil Aviation Agency (AFAC), which falls under the Ministry of Infrastructure, Communications and Transport (SICT), acts as the grantor. This relationship means the government dictates the fundamental economic terms of the business. You can see this control clearly because the AFAC must approve the Master Development Program (MDP) and the Maximum Tariffs that underpin PAC's revenue generation. For instance, the approved MDP and tariffs for the 2025-2029 period were determined based on traffic projections and operating costs, all within the government's regulatory scope. This centralized control over pricing and operational mandates gives the government immense, almost unilateral, power over PAC, which trickles down to how PAC manages its own procurement and supplier relationships.

Government Unilaterally Amended Tariff Base Regulation in October 2023

The government's willingness to exert this power is not just theoretical; it's been demonstrated. Back in October 2023, the AFAC unilaterally changed the Rules for Tariff Regulation, which are set out in Annex 7 of the concession agreements. Fitch Ratings noted at the time that such a unilateral change could reduce concessionaire revenues, and it certainly makes stakeholders question the robustness of the legal framework protecting private investment. While the immediate effect was limited, any modification to the tariffs based on these new rules was set to apply starting January 1, 2025, following the completion of the 2025-2029 review. This regulatory uncertainty, stemming from the grantor's ability to change the rules of the game, forces PAC to operate with a higher perceived risk when negotiating with all its other suppliers, as the government can fundamentally alter the revenue base at any time.

PAC Must Meet Capital Investment Requirements in its Master Development Plan

Because the government approves the MDP, PAC is locked into significant, non-negotiable capital expenditure commitments. For the 2025-2029 period, Grupo Aeroportuario del Pacífico has committed to investments totaling 43,184,959 thousand pesos across its 12 Mexican airports. This is a massive, mandated outlay, representing over US$2.6 billion over the five years. While this investment is designed to increase capacity-for example, Guadalajara International Airport (GDL) alone is slated to receive close to MX$19 billion-it creates a captive demand for construction and maintenance suppliers. The power dynamic shifts here: PAC must spend this money, which increases its dependency on timely and quality execution from its contractors, even if the contractors themselves are fragmented.

Here's a quick look at how that mandated investment is being allocated:

The total committed investment for the Mexican airports over the five-year period is MXP 43,185 million. The allocation to terminal buildings, at 37%, is the largest share, meaning a significant portion of this spending will flow to civil engineering and construction firms.

Suppliers for Construction and Maintenance are Generally Fragmented, Reducing Their Power

In contrast to the government, the actual providers of goods and services-think construction firms, maintenance contractors, and equipment vendors-tend to have less individual leverage. For large-scale infrastructure projects, while PAC has a massive capital commitment, the market for these specialized services in Mexico is generally fragmented. This means PAC can often pit one contractor against another to secure better pricing or terms. To be fair, Grupo Aeroportuario del Pacífico has signed collaboration agreements, such as one with the Mexican Chamber of the Construction Industry (CMIC) Jalisco, to promote development, which suggests some level of supplier organization exists. Still, the overall structure means that for any single project component, the bargaining power of the individual supplier remains relatively low compared to the power of the concession grantor.

The supplier landscape for PAC involves several distinct groups:

• Construction contractors for MDP projects.
• Maintenance providers for ongoing facility upkeep.
• Providers of specialized airport equipment.
• Utility and service providers under local contracts.

If onboarding takes 14+ days, churn risk rises, which is a minor concern for PAC given the scale of its required capital deployment. Finance: draft 13-week cash view by Friday.

Grupo Aeroportuario del Pacífico, S.A.B. de C.V. (PAC) - Porter's Five Forces: Bargaining power of customers

You're analyzing Grupo Aeroportuario del Pacífico, S.A.B. de C.V. (PAC) and the customer power dynamic is definitely split. The power here is best described as moderate, largely because the core aeronautical revenue stream-the Airport Use Fee (TUA)-is heavily regulated by the Mexican government, specifically the Agencia Federal de Aviación Civil (AFAC) under the Secretaría de Infraestructura, Comunicaciones y Transportes (SICT).

This regulation means PAC can't just set prices for the TUA as it sees fit. However, we saw a major regulatory event in 2025. Effective March 1, 2025, Grupo Aeroportuario del Pacífico implemented a significant TUA increase, which the airlines definitely noticed. The hike was 21% for domestic flights and 13.9% for international flights across its Mexican terminals. For key tourist hubs like Puerto Vallarta and Los Cabos, the domestic TUA jumped to 610.50 pesos and 564.30 pesos, respectively, with international TUA reaching 63.25 dollars in both locations. This regulatory structure, which sets the maximum tariffs for the 2025-2029 period, provides revenue visibility but also caps immediate pricing power.

Major airlines, as the direct customers paying the TUA, wield considerable volume-based pressure. They operate the flights and move the bulk of the traffic, so when the TUA was set to increase, the International Air Transport Association (IATA) called for reconsideration, arguing the high percentages would negatively impact airlines and competitiveness. The fact that the TUA can represent up to 70% of a plane ticket's cost gives airlines significant leverage in negotiations or public pushback against proposed increases.

To be fair, Grupo Aeroportuario del Pacífico, S.A.B. de C.V. (PAC) serves a massive and diverse base, which dilutes the power of any single airline customer. For the period spanning January through October 2025, Grupo Aeroportuario del Pacífico, S.A.B. de C.V. (PAC) handled a total of 52.68 million terminal passengers across its 12 Mexican airports, marking a 3.2% year-to-date increase over the first ten months of 2024. This scale is a counterweight to airline bargaining. For instance, its Jamaican asset, Sangster International Airport (MBJ), has a handling capacity of nine million passengers per year.

Here's a quick look at the scale of operations and regulatory context:

The ultimate customers-the passengers-possess very low individual bargaining power. They are price-takers for the TUA component of their ticket, as the fee is set by regulation and their choice is limited to the airlines operating at the airport, not the airport operator itself. If onboarding takes 14+ days, churn risk rises, but here, the passenger has no real negotiation leverage over the airport fee.

Still, the power dynamic shifts when looking at non-aeronautical revenue. This segment, which includes retail concessions and commercial brands operating within the terminals, is largely unregulated. This is where Grupo Aeroportuario del Pacífico, S.A.B. de C.V. (PAC) has more direct pricing control over its customers-the retailers and service providers-giving it greater margin flexibility in that area, unlike the TUA component.

You can see the leverage points:

• Aeronautical revenue power is constrained by AFAC/SICT oversight.
• Airlines have volume leverage against the regulated TUA.
• Passengers have negligible individual negotiation power.
• Retail/commercial revenue streams are unregulated, offering direct pricing power.

Grupo Aeroportuario del Pacífico, S.A.B. de C.V. (PAC) - Porter's Five Forces: Competitive rivalry

Intense rivalry exists between the three major Mexican groups: Grupo Aeroportuario del Pacífico (PAC), Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste (ASUR), and Grupo Aeroportuario del Centro Norte (OMA). You see this competition clearly when you map their top-line performance from the first quarter of 2025 (1Q25).

PAC reported the highest revenue growth in 1Q25, up 30.1% to MX$11.05 billion. That outpaced ASUR, which saw an 18.2% increase to MX$8.79 billion, and OMA, which posted a more modest rise of 15.6% to MX$3.57 billion. It's not just top-line; PAC's net profit also jumped 26.6% to MX$2.70 billion, while ASUR's net income rose 14.2% to MX$3.64 billion and OMA's increased 19.3% to MX$1.29 billion. Honestly, when you see those numbers side-by-side, it shows who is currently capturing the most upside from the market recovery.

Competition is mainly for new routes and non-aeronautical services, not core concessions. The concession structure itself creates regional monopolies, meaning PAC, ASUR, and OMA generally cannot directly compete for the right to operate the existing airports in each other's territories. Instead, the fight is over connectivity and commercial spend per passenger.

For instance, Grupo Aeroportuario del Pacífico added 13 new routes during the first quarter of 2025 alone, comprising 10 international and 3 domestic destinations. Looking ahead, the company was planning to launch 8 new international routes to Canada in the fourth quarter of 2025. That's where the real jockeying happens-securing airline service that drives traffic through your specific set of airports.

Rivalry is regional since concessions grant monopolies in specific geographic areas. PAC operates 14 airports across Mexico and Jamaica, including 5 of Mexico's top 10 busiest airports. This geographic segmentation means the competitive pressure is less about stealing a primary airport and more about maximizing performance within the assigned region.

Here's a quick look at the 1Q25 revenue performance comparison:

The focus on non-aeronautical revenue is a key battleground, as it is less regulated than aeronautical fees. You can see this drive in PAC's 1Q25 results:

• Aeronautical revenue grew 20.9% to MX$6.0 billion.
• Non-aeronautical revenue surged 41.3% to MX$2.39 billion.
• The non-aeronautical segment grew at nearly double the rate of the core aeronautical business for PAC in that quarter.

This pursuit of higher commercial income per passenger is defintely a major competitive lever among the three groups.

Grupo Aeroportuario del Pacífico, S.A.B. de C.V. (PAC) - Porter's Five Forces: Threat of substitutes

Low threat for international and long-haul domestic travel, especially to tourist hubs, is supported by recent traffic trends. For October 2025, Puerto Vallarta saw a 5.2% increase in domestic terminal passengers compared to October 2024, reaching 243.8 thousand passengers. Los Cabos experienced a 2.1% decrease in total terminal passengers in October 2025, totaling 216.2 thousand for that month. Overall, the total number of terminal passengers at Grupo Aeroportuario del Pacífico's 12 Mexican airports increased by 0.7% in October 2025 versus October 2024. For the year-to-date through October 2025, total traffic showed a 5.9% increase compared to the same period in 2024, reaching 30,083.8 thousand passengers.

High-speed rail or bus transport is a viable substitute for short-to-medium domestic routes, though the major HSR projects are not yet operational. The Mexico-Queretaro High-Speed Train project, a $144 billion peso commitment, is slated for operational status in 2027-2028. The Mexican government planned to launch four passenger train projects in 2025, with a total budget of approximately $157 billion pesos allocated for train projects in 2025. These trains are designed to operate at velocities between 160 and 200 kilometers per hour.

Substitution risk is lower for Grupo Aeroportuario del Pacífico's key tourist destinations like Los Cabos and Puerto Vallarta because long-haul leisure travel heavily favors air transport. The year-to-date passenger traffic for January through October 2025 shows growth for these key tourist points:

The Cross Border Xpress (CBX) at Tijuana airport mitigates substitution from US airports by providing a direct, dedicated pedestrian crossing. For the first nine months of 2025, the CBX was utilized by 3.0 million passengers. This infrastructure represented 31.5% of the Tijuana airport's total passenger traffic during that period. The CBX generated an approximate UAFIDA (Adjusted EBITDA) of 75 million USD through September 2025.

Key data points regarding substitution factors include:

• Total terminal passengers at Grupo Aeroportuario del Pacífico's 12 Mexican airports in October 2025: 3,012.2 thousand.
• Total revenue for Grupo Aeroportuario del Pacífico in Q3 2025 increased by 16.3% year-over-year to a figure that included a Ps. 1,174.0 million increase from aeronautical and non-aeronautical services revenues.
• The Tijuana airport saw a 4.2% decrease in total terminal passengers in October 2025.
• The Mexico-Queretaro HSR investment is $144 billion pesos.

Grupo Aeroportuario del Pacífico, S.A.B. de C.V. (PAC) - Porter's Five Forces: Threat of new entrants

You're looking at the barriers to entry in the Mexican airport sector, and honestly, the picture for new competitors is grim. The threat of new entrants for Grupo Aeroportuario del Pacífico, S.A.B. de C.V. (PAC) is extremely low because the structural hurdles are immense. This isn't like starting a new software company; this is about massive, long-term infrastructure control.

The primary gatekeeper is the government itself. To even begin operations, a new entity absolutely needs a government-granted concession from the Ministry of Communications and Transportation (SCT), which is the principal regulator. These concessions are not handed out casually; they are typically granted for an initial term of 50 years, with the possibility of renewal for an additional 50 years. That long-term commitment signals a massive upfront capital requirement that few firms can meet or stomach.

Furthermore, any new concessionaire is bound by a Master Development Program (MDP) that dictates mandatory investments over five-year periods, which must be approved by the SICT. This locks in future capital expenditure before a single passenger even lands. To be fair, the scale of existing operations already sets a high bar. Look at Grupo Aeroportuario del Pacífico, S.A.B. de C.V. (PAC)'s own performance; their Q1 2025 EBITDA hit Ps. 5,628.8 million. A new entrant would need to finance infrastructure capable of generating revenue streams on that scale, plus cover the initial concession cost, which for PAC was valued in the tens of billions of pesos.

Here's a quick look at the structural and financial demands that keep the field clear:

The market structure itself reinforces this low threat. The sector is an established oligopoly dominated by the three major privatized groups: Grupo Aeroportuario del Pacífico, S.A.B. de C.V. (PAC), Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste (ASUR), and Grupo Aeroportuario del Centro Norte (OMA). These three control the bulk of the international passenger traffic and infrastructure.

This concentration means that any potential new entrant would likely face intense regulatory scrutiny and competition from incumbents who already have established relationships with regulators and deep operational experience. The existing players are also actively reinvesting; for instance, the private operators, including PAC, are set to contribute approximately MXN102.6 billion (or 76.6%) of the planned nationwide airport modernization investment between 2025 and 2030.

The barriers to entry can be summarized by these key structural elements:

• Government-controlled asset ownership via concession.
• Initial concession term of 50 years minimum.
• Mandatory, long-term capital investment plans (MDP).
• High capital outlay required to match existing scale.
• Foreign ownership generally capped at 49%.

The regulatory framework definitely favors the incumbents. It's a tough nut to crack, making the threat of new entrants negligible in the near term, despite the stated goal of the Mexican Airport Law to promote competition.

Finance: review the 2026 capital budget against the 2025 projected CAPEX for the Guadalajara expansion by next Tuesday.